In retrospect, the emergence of SARS was inevitable. If there was a setting designed to hone and amplify pathogens, it is the Chinese open-air, or "wet", markets where wild animals are sold to consumers with a taste for exotic meat. When science journalist Sonia Shah visited one such market in 2011, part of the impressive research she undertook for *Pandemic*, she discovered "row after row of animals who\'d rarely if ever encounter each other in the wild...breathing, urinating, defecating, and eating next to each other". 8 years earlier, in a marketplace in Guangzhou in south China, a coronavirus had spread from its usual home in horseshoe bats to the animals in the surrounding cages, among them raccoon dogs, ferret badgers, and snakes. The number of species that were infected is anybody\'s guess, but the real mayhem occurred when the virus lodged in the respiratory system of the palm civet, a tree-dwelling cat-like creature. It was within this animal that the virus mutated into a form capable of infecting human beings

*Pandemic* elegantly outlines the biological, geographical, and technological events that produce an outbreak of disease that can spread across countries and continents. A pathogen that acquires the ability to pass from human to human is just one precondition. For a pandemic to take hold, the pathogen needs to be able to move. SARS could easily have run its course in south China were it not for a confluence of travellers at an ordinary hotel in Kowloon, Hong Kong. A doctor who had treated patients with the virus at Sun Yat-Sen Memorial Hospital in Guangzhou checked into this hotel, then called the Metropole, while he attended a wedding. During his stay, he infected a dozen other residents. These residents caught flights to five countries on three continents. Soon enough, SARS was present in 32 nations around the world. "Thanks to the miracle of air travel, one infected man seeded a global outbreak", writes Shah.

She skilfully exemplifies the story of pandemics through the tale of cholera, describing its emergence from the sea, and its expansion around the globe, along with the living conditions that facilitated its spread. It is a well-chosen approach---each of the seven major cholera outbreaks of the past 200 years occurred because of factors that typically propel a pandemic. The disease broke out in New York City in 1849, for example, after the Irish famine drove thousands across the Atlantic, where they settled in filthy and overcrowded conditions in Manhattan, an island where municipal corruption had limited the already scarce access to clean water.

Indeed, governmental malaise and misconduct can do much to ease a pathogen\'s path. In 1911, when Naples was wracked by a cholera epidemic that eventually killed an estimated 18 000--20 000 people, the Italian prime minister stated that the priority was "to obtain and maintain the greatest possible secrecy". Newspapers were bribed, telegrams were censored, and medical societies raided. "Cholera victims were transported to hospitals in the dead of night, while local papers blared, 'There is no cholera, and never was!'", writes Shah. Almost a century later, the Chinese authorities refused to acknowledge that SARS existed (eventually they conceded that the country had seen a handful of deaths from "atypical pneumonia"). They were reluctant to admit investigative teams from WHO. But information is as difficult to contain as any virus. A Guangzhou local mentioned the outbreak online, and word soon reached the Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases (ProMED). "Have you heard of an epidemic in Guangzhou?", enquired a retired naval captain. "An acquaintance of mine from a teacher\'s chat room lives there and reports that hospitals are closed and people are dying."

Adequate surveillance systems, for both human and animal pathogens, are crucial to contain a pandemic. "Because the SARS virus was not noticed until it had spread into south China\'s massive wet markets and started sickening people, containing it required muscular quarantines and travel restrictions that bled Asia\'s tourism industry of more than \$25 billion", points out Shah. Had the H5N1 influenza virus (avian influenza) been promptly tackled in the late 1990s, it would probably not be lingering in poultry flocks today. Shah notes that surveillance systems in over 100 countries are substandard. But aside from strengthening such systems, Shah offers little in the way of prescription. She recognises that while modernity will probably determine the nature of the next pandemic pathogen, perhaps it will emerge from climate change, habitat destruction, or factory farming, microbes have been on the planet for far longer than any other form of life. This is a microbial world, and epidemics are as natural a phenomenon as a thunderstorm.

Recent history attests to the difficulty in predicting the next pandemic. But it would not be wise to discount influenza. "Of all the new pathogens emerging today, novel influenza viruses like H5N1 are the ones that keep the most virologists up at night", Shah writes. "If H5N1 or any other novel avian influenza evolved to transmit effectively between humans, the death toll would be swift and substantial". In a microbial world, a storm is always on the horizon.
